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Property Rights Legislation in Agricultural 
Biotechnology: United States and Argentina 
Andres A. Gallo* & Jay P. Kesan** 
INTRODUCTION 
The market for biotechnology products has expanded 
rapidly in the 1990s and is expected to result in radical changes 
in agriculture around the world.1  Investment in research and 
development of new seed varieties has become a key factor for 
agricultural development.2  In the past few decades, the 
investment in research and development has largely shifted 
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 1. The market for transgenic crops will continue to grow: 
    The [International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech 
Applications] ISAAA projects that the global market value of 
transgenic crops will increase from between $4.5 billion and $4.7 
billion in 2003, to $5 billion or more in 2005. In 2002, the global 
market was estimated at $4 billion, representing 15 percent of the 
$31 billion global crop protection market and 13 percent of the $30 
billion global commercial seed market. The ISAAA says the estimated 
market value is based on the sale price of transgenic seed plus any 
technology fees that apply. 
Doris de Guzman, Surge in US Biotech Crops Continues, CHEM. MARKET REP., 
Apr. 12, 2004, at 13. 
      2.  The high cost of research and development is a limiting factor in 
emergence of biotechnology products: 
    Biotechnology is an expensive market to break into. Sources 
estimate that biotechnology research and development (R&D) costs 
more than $200 million for just one product. . . . [G]etting a biotech 
drug to market is a difficult and expensive process. After years of 
laboratory research, hurdles consisting of clinical trials and 
governmental approval must be crossed before a drug can even make 
it to market. 
Jay P. Kesan, Intellectual Property Protection and Agricultural 
Biotechnology: A Multidisciplinary Perspective, 44 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 
464, 465-66 (2000) (citation omitted). 
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from state-sponsored research to private funding.3  At the same 
time, the market became dominated by a few multinational 
firms that now control most biotechnological research and 
development around the world.4  In this new environment of 
largely private control of an international market, the 
protection of intellectual property rights and its role in shaping 
the biotech market have drawn academic attention and been 
                                                          
 3. See Philip G. Pardey, Bonwoo Koo & Carol Nottenburg, Creating, 
Protecting, and Using Crop Biotechnologies Worldwide in an Era of 
Intellectual Property, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 213, 217 (2004).  This shift 
seems to be the result of robust growth of private research and development 
(R&D) funding while public funding has remained relatively constant: 
    The dramatic increase in private sector plant breeding R&D 
expenditures came while public expenditure in that area changed 
very little in real terms. On the whole, private spending on plant 
breeding has steadily increased since 1960 as the seed industry 
increased in size and extent of commercialization. Private sector R&D 
expenditure has shifted over this period, in percentage terms, from 
farm machinery and food and kindred products to agricultural 
chemicals and plant breeding research. 
JORGE FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE SEED INDUSTRY IN 
U.S. AGRICULTURE: AN EXPLORATION OF DATA AND INFORMATION ON CROP 
SEED MARKETS, REGULATION, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, AND RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT 42 (2004) (citation omitted). 
    Private agricultural research is displacing public research 
generally and specifically regarding the development of new varieties 
of crops that have high commercial value. This tendency is especially 
pronounced in countries like the United States where private 
agricultural research and development was ninety percent of public 
spending in 1960, growing to 133 percent by 1996, the latest year for 
which comparable public-private data are available. Private 
investments, fueled by agricultural biotechnology research, gravitate 
to techniques which promise large markets, are protected by 
intellectual property rights, and are easily transferable across 
agroecologies. 
Pardey, Koo & Nottenburg, supra, at 217-18 (footnotes omitted). 
 4. “The 1990s have witnessed considerable acceleration in the process of 
consolidation of the seed industry with the emergence of giant life-science 
companies.  Companies such as Novartis, Monsanto, Du Pont, Astra-Zeneca, 
Dow Agrosciences, and Aventis are major players not only in seeds, but also in 
agro-chemicals, pharmaceuticals, diagnostics and vaccines.”  C.S. Srinivasan, 
Concentration in Ownership of Plant Variety Rights: Some Implications for 
Developing Countries, 28 FOOD POL’Y 519, 522 (2003).  “According to RAFI, the 
top five Gene Giants (AstaZeneca [sic], DuPont, Monsanto, Novartis and 
Aventis) account for nearly two-thirds of the global pesticide market (60%), 
almost one-quarter (23%) of the commercial seed market, and virtually 100% 
of the transgenic (genetically modified) seed market.”  Press Release, Rural 
Advancement Found. Int’l, World Seed Conference: Shrinking Club of 
Industry Giants Gather for Wake or Pep Rally? (Sept. 3, 1999), 
http://www.etcgroup.org/documents/news_worldseed.pdf. 
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the focus of many articles and studies.5  Governments, 
international organizations, the private sector (firms and 
farmers), scholars, and scientists are discussing the 
implications of these changes in the market for seeds and how 
property rights should be defined and enforced to promote 
social welfare.6  Private companies have tried to enforce 
intellectual property rights over new varieties of seeds in 
international markets to protect their investments.  However, 
different countries offer different legal protection, and in many 
cases developing countries have insisted on minimal property 
rights to favor their farmers and obtain new technologies at the 
lowest possible cost.7 
                                                          
 5. See, e.g., Julian M. Alston & Raymond J. Venner, The Effects of the US 
Plant Variety Protection Act on Wheat Genetic Improvement, 31 RES. POL’Y 527 
(2002); M.C.F. Diez, The Impact of Plant Varieties Rights on Research: The 
Case of Spain, 27 FOOD POL’Y 171 (2002); George B. Frisvold, John Sullivan & 
Anton Raneses, Genetic Improvements in Major US Crops: The Size and 
Distribution of Benefits, 28 AGRIC. ECON.: J. INT’L ASS’N AGRIC. ECONOMISTS 
109 (2003); Peter D. Goldsmith, Innovation, Supply Chain Control, and the 
Welfare of Farmers, 44 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1302 (2001); Gregory D. Graff, 
Gordon C. Rausser & Arthur A. Small, Agricultural Biotechnology’s 
Complementary Intellectual Assets, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 349 (2003); Mark 
D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, U.S. Plant Variety Protection: Sound and Fury . . .?, 
39 HOUS. L. REV. 727 (2002) [hereinafter Janis & Kesan, Sound and Fury];  
Kesan, supra note 2; William Lesser, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Concentration in Agricultural Biotechnology, 1 AGBIOFORUM 56 (1998); 
GianCarlo Moschini & Harvey Lapan, Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Welfare Effects of Agricultural R&D, 79 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1229 (1997); D.D. 
Rohrbach, I.J. Minde & J. Howard, Looking Beyond National Boundaries: 
Regional Harmonization of Seed Policies, Laws and Regulations, 28 FOOD 
POL’Y 317 (2003); Timothy Swanson & Timo Göschl, Property Rights Issues 
Involving Plant Genetic Resources: Implications of Ownership for Economic 
Efficiency, 32 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 75 (2000); GianCarlo Moschini, Economic 
Benefits and Costs of Biotechnology Innovations in Agriculture (Ctr. for Agric. 
and Rural Dev., Iowa State Univ., Working Paper No. 01-WP 264, 2001), 
available at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/research/webpapers/paper_1924.pdf; 
Peter Goldsmith, Gabriel Ramos & Carlos Steiger, Intellectual Property 
Protection and the International Marketing of Agricultural Biotechnology: 
Firm and Host Country Impacts (2002), 
http://www.farmfoundation.org/projects/documents/case2_ipr22.pdf; Mark D. 
Janis & Jay P. Kesan, Weed-Free I.P.: The Supreme Court, Intellectual 
Property Interfaces, and the Problem of Plants (Nov. 2001), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=290634 [hereinafter Janis & Kesan, Weed-
Free I.P.]. 
 6. See, e.g., FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 3; see also Pardey, Koo & 
Nottenburg, supra note 3 (describing the role of intellectual property rights in 
the international context). 
 7. This seems to reflect a dichotomy between the Northern and Southern 
Hemispheres: 
The argument made by Northern countries is that while prices may 
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One of the most important issues regarding biotechnology 
is the legal environment in which seeds are to be produced and 
traded.  A homogeneous legal framework characterizes 
domestic markets, while different legal regimes can distort or 
change marketing and production incentives in international 
markets.  This Article analyzes the legal differences between 
the United States and Argentina, two of the most important 
exporters of grains in the world.  As we show, the evolution of 
laws and regulations in both countries helps us understand the 
challenges of generating uniform protection in international 
markets as well as the incentives for private sector companies 
under different legal systems.  We will highlight the differences 
in property rights protection as well as the incentives for 
producers and traders. 
ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD 
MARKETS 
Argentina and the United States are important actors in 
international agricultural markets.  In Argentina, the market 
liberalization during the 1990s gave new impetus to 
agricultural production, and soybean was one of the crops that 
benefited the most.8  An intensified interest in new seed 
varieties and the introduction of genetically modified seeds in 
1996 accompanied the impressive growth in grain exports.9 
 
                                                          
rise in the short run, new technologies will be available over the long 
term and will, in turn, raise economic productivity.  As the result of 
protected property rights, the South will gain from new investment. . . 
. For the net technology using countries (South) the significant short 
term costs may arise directly from an increase in the cost of the input 
due to the lack of complete substitutes and indirectly from the 
administrative and enforcement costs of a Northern style [intellectual 
property rights] IPR protection system.  Adding to the complexity is 
the fact that welfare impacts are best understood in a dynamic 
context, as the short-term losses of strengthening the South’s IPR 
regime are believed to be trumped by the long-term gain from 
economic growth. 
Goldsmith, Ramos & Steiger, supra note 5, at 4 (citations omitted). 
 8. See RANDALL D. SCHNEPF, ERIK N. DOHLMAN & CHRISTINE BOLLING, 
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURE IN BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA: 
DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS FOR MAJOR FIELD CROPS 22 (2001). 
 9. See id. at 23. 
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GRAPH 1.  CORN AND SOYBEAN PLANTED IN ARGENTINA10 
Graph 1: Hectares Planted with Corn and Soybean
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Since the 1978-79 season, the area planted with soybean in 
Argentina has steadily grown (Graph 1).11  The total growth 
from 1978 to 2003 reached 669%, while total production went 
from 2.5 million metric tons to 35 million in 2003.  During the 
same period the area planted with corn declined 6.5%, but 
production increased 72.9% due to improvements in yield.  The 
boom in soybean production has propelled Argentina into the 
spotlight in international markets.  Total production of corn 
represented just 2.6% of total world production for the period 
1999-2000 to 2001-02.  Nonetheless, total exports of coarse 
grains were 11.6% of total world exports (Table 2). 
Argentina and the United States are among the largest 
exporters of grain and oilseeds (Tables 1 and 2).  In the case of 
soybeans, the United States and Argentina represent 58.2% of 
total world exports, while Argentina is the main exporter of 
soybean oil and meal.  The United States and Argentina are 
the leading exporters of coarse grains (Table 2).  The United 
States also leads the world in wheat exports, and Argentina 
ranks fifth (Table 2).  As a result, both countries play an 
important role in international agriculture markets.  The 
strength of both countries in international markets is also 
                                                          
 10. For graph data, see Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia Pesca y 
Alimentos (SAGPyA), Estimaciones Agricolas, 
http://www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/new/0-
0/agricultura/otros/estimaciones/basestima.php (last visited Mar. 18, 2006). 
 11. See id.   
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reflected in the market for new seeds (Table 3).  In this case, 
the United States is first in the consumption of new varieties 
while Argentina is eighth.  Finally, Argentina, following the 
United States, was one of the earliest adopters of genetically 
modified crops, especially soybean and corn.12  Since 1996, the 
Argentine government has approved the use of genetically 
modified seeds, and farmers have been adopting Roundup 
Ready soybean and Bt corn intensively.13  In the case of 
soybean, the area sown with genetically modified seeds rose 
from 6% in 1996 to 99.5% in 2002-03, while genetically 
modified corn increased from 0.25% to 40% during the same 
period; cotton went from 2.7% to 20%.14  Despite the impressive 
increase in new technological advances, there are important 
gaps in the amount of investment in research and development 
of new varieties, which are, in part, due to the investment gap 
between developed and developing countries.15  Part of this gap 
also corresponds to the incentives offered by different 
regulatory regimes in each country.16 
                                                          
 12. “In 2002 four countries accounted for 99% of total area sown with 
genetically modified crops: United States with 39.0 million hectares (66% of 
total), Argentina with 13.5 million hectares (23%), Canada with 3.5 million 
hectares (6% of total) and China with 2.1 million hectares (4% of total).” 
CARMEN VICIEN, TENEDENCIAS EN EL DESARROLLO E INTRODUCCION DE 
MATERIALES GENETICAMENTE MODIFICADOS EN EL SECTOR AGRICOLA 
ARGENTINO.  ESTUDIO SOBRE EL SECTOR AGROALIMENTARIO.  COMPONENTE B: 
REDES AGROALIMENTARIAS.  TRAMAS.  OFICINA DE LA CEPAL-ONU – 
MINISTERIO DE ECONOMIA DE LA NACION 5 (2003) (on file with authors). 
 13. See U.S.  GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BIOTECHNOLOGY: INFORMATION 
ON PRICES OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED SEEDS IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
ARGENTINA 7 (2000). 
 14. See OSCAR AGUSTIN DOMINGO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MEDIUM-SIZED ARGENTINIAN SEED 
COMPANY 8 (2003), 
http://www.upov.int/en/documents/Symposium2003/wipo_upov_sym_13.pdf. 
 15. This gap is significant and may be growing: 
In 1995 developed countries spent $5.43 on public and private 
agricultural research and development for every one hundred dollars 
of agricultural output, compared with just sixty-six cents per one 
hundred dollars of output for developing countries.  The eightfold 
difference in total research intensities illustrates the size of the 
technological gap in agriculture between rich and poor countries.  
Moreover, the situation is growing worse.  The difference in public 
research intensity ratios was 3.5-fold in the 1970s, compared with 4.3-
fold now.  An even wider gap would have opened up if private 
spending was also factored in. 
Pardey, Koo & Nottenburg, supra note 3, at 218 (footnotes omitted). 
 16. See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Insecure Property Rights and 
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Given the important role the United States and Argentina 
play in international grain markets, an analysis of the 
differences in property rights legislation is meaningful to 
understand market behavior and the incentives producers face 
in each country. 
 
TABLE 1.  INTERNATIONAL EXPORTS IN SOYBEAN17 
Table 1: International Trade: Soybean Exports 
(Percentage of Total World Exports) 
 Soybean Soybean Meal Soybean Oil 
Brazil 33.4 32.0 28.5 
Argentina 13.7 42.8 50.3 
Paraguay 4.4 1.8 1.9 
Bolivia 0.5 2.2 2.6 
United States 44.5 12.4 5.8 
Canada 1.6 0.2 0.2 
Asia 0.7 6.7 1.7 
China 0.6 1.5 0.4 
Rest of World 0.3 1.9 8.8 
 
                                                          
Plant Varieties: The Effect on the Market for Seeds in Argentina 14-20 (July 
25, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/cgi-
bin/pdf_view.pl?paperid=16347&ftype=.pdf (showing how differences in 
property rights protection between Argentina and the United States has 
produced a lower amount of investment in Argentina’s seed market). 
 17. For table data, see U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Market and Trade Data, 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/archive/asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2006). 
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TABLE 2.  INTERNATIONAL EXPORTS IN COARSE GRAINS AND 
WHEAT18 
Table 2: International Trade: Coarse Grains 
and Wheat 
(Percentage of Total World Exports) 
Coarse Grains Wheat 
Argentina 11.6 Argentina 8.9 
Australia 4.8 Australia 13.4 
Canada 2.6 Canada 13.0 
China 9.4 India 3.5 
Brazil 3.6 Kazakhstan 3.9 
Russia 2.2 Russia 6.4 
South Africa 1.2 Syria 0.7 
  Turkey 1.0 
Ukraine 4.3 Ukraine 3.8 
EU-25 5.9 EU-25 13.4 
Others 4.5 Other Europe 1.1 
  Others 5.7 
United States 49.8 United States 25.1 
Note: Coarse Grains include Corn, Barley, Sorghum, Rye and 
Oats 
                                                          
 18. For table data, see U.S. Dep’t of Agric., FASonline, 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/oilseeds/circular/2006/06-02/toc.htm (last visited Mar. 
18, 2006). 
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TABLE 3.  INTERNATIONAL SEED MARKETS19 
Table 3: Estimated Values of Commercial 
Markets for Seed 
Country Internal Commercial Market 
(Million of Dollars) 
United States 5700 23.2% 
China 3000 12.2% 
Japan 2500 10.2% 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
2000 8.1% 
France 1370 5.6% 
Brazil 1200 4.9% 
Germany 1000 4.1% 
Argentina 930 3.8% 
India 900 3.7% 
Italy 650 2.6% 
United Kingdom 570 2.3% 
Canada 550 2.2% 
Poland 400 1.6% 
Mexico 350 1.4% 
Spain 300 1.2% 
Netherlands 300 1.2% 
Australia 280 1.1% 
Hungary 200 0.8% 
Denmark 200 0.8% 
Sweden 200 0.8% 
Other 1967 8.0% 
Total 24567  
PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION AROUND THE WORLD 
Property rights protection for seeds in international 
markets is far from uniform.20  Each country has devised its 
own rules and regulations, and producers have to deal with 
these differences when trading or doing business with other 
                                                          
 19. See FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 3, at 8. 
 20. See W. Lesser, An Economic Approach to Identifying an “Effective Sui 
Generis System” for Plant Variety Protection Under TRIPs, 16 AGRIBUSINESS 
96, 109-10 (2000) (explaining some different types of property rights protection 
in the international arena). 
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countries.  One of the most important initiatives for the 
homogenization of intellectual property rights is the Trade- 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)21 
established by the World Trade Organization (WTO) for all 
member countries.22 
Another important organization seeking uniformity for 
plant variety protection is the International Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).23  This 
international organization is comprised of a group of countries 
that designs rules for the protection of property rights.24  Even 
though UPOV is representative of the international 
community, it lacks any enforcement power, and the guidelines 
and rules approved must be implemented by member 
governments.25  In this regard, UPOV resolutions have to be 
broad enough to be accepted in each member country.  If UPOV 
recommendations are too specific or strict, many countries, 
especially developing countries that are consumers of the new 
technologies, might not comply.  On the other hand, if the rules 
are too broad, there is no meaningful protection of property 
rights for seed producers.  For this reason, United States 
companies have been very uneasy about UPOV, since UPOV 
rules provide less stringent property rights protection than the 
domestic regulatory system.  On the other hand, countries like 
                                                          
 21. The aim of TRIPS was to establish a uniform standard for intellectual 
property protection:   
   In 1994 the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) was concluded as part of the Uruguay Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations establishing the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  Before TRIPS, the only international 
framework for intellectual property was the Paris Convention of 1883, 
but unlike TRIPS, the Paris Convention did not impose any uniform 
standard of intellectual property protection and countries were free to 
establish their own intellectual property laws. 
Amy Nelson, Note, Is There an International Solution to Intellectual Property 
Protection for Plants?, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 997, 1008 (2005) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 22. “TRIPS thus requires WTO Member States to provide some form of 
intellectual property protection for plant varieties.” Id.  
 23. See International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 
http://www.upov.org (last visited Feb. 10, 2006). 
 24. See Members of the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants, http://www.upov.org/en/about/members/pdf/pub423.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2006) (listing the member nations and the date at which 
they became members). 
 25. See Nelson, supra note 21, at 1004. 
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Argentina find UPOV rules to be too strict for local farmers 
and, as a result, have failed to pass some of these rules into 
law.26 
       The first general UPOV proposal was agreed upon in 1978 
(UPOV 78),27 and it recommended that the participant 
countries establish a system of property rights protection for 
seeds based on the granting of commercialization rights,28 a 
legal instrument similar to the Plan Variety Protection Act 
(PVPA) certificates in the United States.29  This system was 
considered a novelty in many developing countries, and the 
European Union supported it, yet it was considered insufficient 
for the United States government and most of the private 
sector engaged in the production of seeds.30  Because of 
pressure from the private sector and the Unites States 
government, UPOV approved a new set of recommendations in 
                                                          
 26. Concerns about local agriculture and farmers have affected 
implementation of plant variety protection rights in many developing 
countries: 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs), which followed from the international trade 
negotiations of the Uruguay Round, requires all member-countries of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) to provide for an “effective” 
system of plant variety protection within a specified time frame.  This 
has significantly accelerated the spread of PVP systems across 
countries.  Many developing countries are currently in the process of 
enacting PVP legislation, even as they face an intense debate about 
the potential economic impacts of PVP on their agriculture and 
farmers. 
C.S. Srinivasan, supra note 4, at 520 (footnote and citation omitted). 
 27. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703 (as revised at Geneva on Oct. 23, 1978) 
available at 
http://www.upov.org/en/publications/conventions/1978/pdf/act1978.pdf . 
 28. See id. at art. 5. 
 29. See 7 U.S.C. § 2351(a) (2000). 
 30. Plant variety protection rights may be inherently less valuable than 
other forms of intellectual property: 
Under plant variety protection schemes, farmers may legally save, 
reuse, and sometimes sell seeds in following seasons so that seed 
firms are faced with only the residual demand for their seeds in 
subsequent seasons.  This problem, together with the difficulty of 
monitoring and enforcing property rights to seed, makes its legal 
protection less valuable than other forms of protection on other 
products.  Private seed markets have responded to the appropriability 
problem by developing hybrid varieties or pursuing genetic use 
restriction technologies (GURTs). These methods prevent seeds from 
effectively reproducing and serve as a form of “biological” rather than 
legal property protection. 
Pardey, Koo & Nottenburg, supra note 3, at 225 (footnote omitted). 
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1991 (UPOV 91).31  The recommendations included more robust 
protection, limiting farmers’ rights of use32 and allowing the 
coexistence of diverse regulatory regimes for seed production.33  
The last issue was particularly important for the United States, 
where seed producers have a vast array of legal instruments to 
protect their varieties, such as a PVPA certificate, a plant 
patent, or even a utility patent.  Despite this effort to bring the 
United States closer to the international regulatory regime, 
UPOV 91 has faced opposition in several countries.  For 
example, despite some attempts, Congress in Argentina has not 
approved UPOV 91,34 and, as a consequence, foreign seed 
producers cannot resort to the patent system for their varieties. 
Thus, a uniform international regulatory regime for seed 
producers remains an unrealized goal.  Seed producers will face 
different regulatory frameworks in different countries, and the 
adaptation to those regimes is important for their economic 
success.  Furthermore, incentives for production and 
commercialization of new varieties in international markets 
will be affected by differences in property rights protection.  
Business strategies will differ from country to country, and 
                                                          
 31. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703 (as revised at Geneva on Mar. 19, 1991) 
[hereinafter UPOV91], available at  
http://www.upov.org/en/publications/conventions/1991/pdf/act1991.pdf. 
 32. See id. at art. 14.  Under the 1991 Act countries have implemented 
farmers’ rights differently: 
The 1978 UPOV Act allows a universal farmers’ privilege – indirectly 
by not classifying such use as an infringement.  The 1991 Act (Article 
15.2), however, makes the farmers’ exemption optional at the national 
level.  The US has decided to allow a full Farmers’ Exemption, while 
the EU requires that large farms pay a royalty. 
Lesser, supra note 20, at 111 (citation omitted). 
 33. See UPOV91, supra note 31, at art. 4.  The 1991 Act obviated the need 
for member nations to make an either/or choice of intellectual property forms 
for plant varieties: 
Whereas the 1961 UPOV Convention stipulated that each member 
state could recognize the right of the breeder by granting either a 
special title of protection or a patent, the 1991 UPOV Convention 
stipulates only that each contracting party shall grant and protect 
breeders’ rights, thereby allowing EPC member states to eliminate 
the exclusionary provisions for plant varieties from their patent acts. 
Nelson, supra note 21, at 1005-06 (footnote omitted). 
 34. See Members of the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants, http://www.upov.org/en/about/members/pdf/pub423.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2006). 
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technology transfers to less developed countries could suffer 
from this heterogeneity. 
SEED PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Intellectual property protection for seeds in the United 
States is very well enforced.  Seed producers can resort to 
various legal instruments to protect their inventions and 
enforce their property rights in the marketplace.35  As a result, 
the intellectual property regime in the United States is one of 
the friendliest in the world for biotechnology inventors.  The 
regimes available for seed producers include the Plant Patent 
Act of 1930 (PPA),36 PVPA certificates,37 and the Patent Act of 
                                                          
 35. See Janis & Kesan, Sound and Fury, supra note 5, at 730-45 
(describing the protection and incentives provided by the various intellectual 
property regimes in the United States). 
 36. See 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000).  This was the first U.S. law to specifically 
address plant breeding: 
The first IPR legislation enacted to specifically address issues of plant 
breeding was the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA).  Administered by 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), the PPA provides 
patent protection over asexually or vegetatively reproduced plant 
varieties.  The PPA also includes patent protection for spores, 
mutants, hybrids, newly found seedlings, or plants found in an 
uncultivated state, and extends property rights for a period of 17 
years. 
FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 3, at 19.  “[I]n the Townsend-Purnell Plant 
Patent Act of 1930, Congress created a plant patent regime limited to varieties 
that had been asexually reproduced.”  Janis & Kesan, Sound and Fury, supra 
note 5, at 734-35 (footnote omitted).  “Enactment of the PPA was driven 
largely by an increasing concern that plant breeders should be rewarded like 
other inventors for their investment in developing new plant varieties, and 
that the absence of patent rights would undermine the incentive to engage in 
plant breeding.”  Nelson, supra note 21, at 999 (footnote omitted). 
 37. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2331, 2351-2357, 2371-2372, 2401-2404, 2421-
2427, 2441-2443, 2461-2463, 2481-2486, 2501-2504, 2531-2532, 2541-2545, 
2561-2570, 2581-2583 (2000).  “The Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) 
grants breeders a Certificate of Protection that gives them exclusive rights to 
market a new plant variety for 18 years from the date of issuance.  These 
exclusive rights are subject to a research exemption and a farmer’s 
exemption.”  FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 3, at 19. 
The 1994 amendment to the PVPA, which went into effect in April 
1995, brought the PVPA into conformity with international standards 
established by the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants and allowed the United States to ratify the 1991 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties.  
Protection provided by Certificates of Protection extended from 18 to 
20 years for most crops. 
Id.  “Plant variety protection is also now a fixture of U.S. law, the U.S. PVPA 
having been enacted in 1970 after only the briefest of debate.”  Janis & Kesan, 
Sound and Fury, supra note 5, at 742 (footnote omitted). 
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1952.38  The extension of property rights protection for seed 
producers reached a high point when the U.S. Supreme Court 
reinforced the role of utility patents for plant varieties.  By 
allowing the use of utility patents for plants in the key case of 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty39 and in the recent case of J.E.M. Ag 
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Breed Int’l, Inc.,40 the Supreme Court 
gave seed producers full protection for their new varieties.41  In 
                                                          
[W]hen the Clinton Administration finally submitted the 1991 text of 
the UPOV treaty to the Senate for ratification, the Administration 
emphasized the benefits of the PVPA as a reciprocity vehicle.  The 
United States did eventually join the UPOV, perhaps guaranteeing 
the continued existence of the U.S. PVPA in some form. 
Id. at 745 (footnotes omitted). 
The PVPA provides patent-like coverage for plants not covered by the 
PPA (that is, sexually-reproduced plants and tuber-propagated 
plants). . . . Under the PVPA, protection extends to selling, importing, 
exporting, sexually reproducing, or using the variety to produce 
another variety. The PVPA, however, contains a save seed exemption 
and a research exemption. 
Nelson, supra note 21, at 1002 (footnotes omitted). 
 38. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).  This greatly expanded the subject matter 
eligible for protection: 
The Patent Act of 1952 (PA) extends patent rights to agricultural 
innovations under a much more general category that includes “any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof.”  Patent 
protection under the PA covers agricultural machinery, equipment, 
chemicals, production processes, and similar inventions, and is 
termed “utility patent protection.”  More importantly, the PA’s broad 
definition of what may be entitled to patent protection leaves an 
important opening for covering innovations in biotechnology and 
genetic engineering. 
FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 3, at 19. 
 39. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).  “In Chakrabarty, decided in 1980, the Court 
ushered in the age of biotechnology patenting, holding in a 5-4 split that 
genetically-modified bacteria fell within the scope of patent-eligible subject 
matter.”  Janis & Kesan, Weed-Free I.P., supra note 5, at 7. 
 40. 534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
 41. See id. at 145. 
   In a 6-2 decision handed down in December 2001, the US Supreme 
Court has confirmed that plants are eligible subject matter for 
protection under the utility patent regime, notwithstanding the 
existence of limited forms of intellectual property protection for plants 
under the Plant Patent Act (PPA) and the Plant Variety Protection 
Act (PVPA). The case, J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, endorsed 
a longstanding practice of the US Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO), under which the PTO has issued hundreds of utility patents on 
plants since 1985. 
Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, Intellectual Property Protection for Plant 
Innovation: Unresolved Issues After J.E.M. v. Pioneer, 20 NATURE 
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addition, the U.S. government amended the PVPA regime to 
conform to the new UPOV agreement of 1991.42  That said, 
producers consider the PVPA regime, proposed by UPOV to 
promote regulatory uniformity, to be a weak tool for the 
protection of property rights when considered alone without a 
utility patent regime.  These legal developments were 
accompanied by an impressive increase in private sector 
participation in seed production and a rush to patent new 
varieties (Tables 4 and 5).  We also observed an increase in the 
number of utility patents devoted to biotechnology patents for 
plant varieties (Graph 2).  Furthermore, these legal changes 
helped to foster research and development efforts in 
biotechnology and the creation and adoption of genetically 
modified seeds.  As a result, we have a system in which 
property rights are well-defined and enforced, and researchers 
can choose the level of protection they consider sufficient to 
effectively protect their inventions in the market. 
 
GRAPH 2.  AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES43 
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BIOTECHNOLOGY 1161, 1161 (2002) (footnote omitted). 
 42 See FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 3, at 20. 
 43 For graph data, see Econ. Research Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Data: 
Agricultural Biotechnology Intellectual Property, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/AgBiotechIP/Gallery/Graphic1.htm (last visited 
KESAN_FINAL.DOC 05/11/2006  02:16:40 PM 
580 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 7:2 
 
 
TABLE 4.  AWARDED AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES44 
Table 4: U.S. agricultural biotechnology patent awards by technology 
classification, 1976-2000 1/ 
Technology Class 1976-
80 
1981-
85 
1986-
90 
1991-
95 
1996-
2000 
Total 
Plant Technologies 54 91 244 576 2,011 2,976 
Protection, Nutrition, and 
Biological Control of Plants 
and Animals 
76 154 277 512 865 1,884 
Pharmaceuticals 72 89 150 248 718 1,277 
Patented organisms, Nonplant 14 76 214 347 795 1,446 
Metabolic Pathways and 
Biological Processes in 
Animals 
39 25 79 166 454 763 
Metabolic Pathways and 
Biological Processes in Plants
156 181 263 255 716 1,571 
Metabolic Pathways and 
Biological Processes, DNA-
Scale 
0 5 79 199 961 1,244 
Genetic Transformation  25 100 364 908 2,732 4,129 
Genomics 0 0 10 54 265 329 
U.S. agricultural biotechnology patent awards by assignee sector and 
national origin, 1976-2000 
1976-
80 
1981-
85 
1986-
90 
1991-
95 
1996-
2000 
Total 
U.S. Firm 167 239 481 893 2,551 4,331 
U.S. Nonprofit 49 104 231 526 1,434 2,344 
U.S. Government 18 27 54 129 193 421 
U.S. Independent 0 2 3 7 15 27 
Non-U.S. Firm 107 162 434 660 1,688 3,051 
Non-U.S. Nonprofit 5 13 31 103 291 443 
Non-U.S. Government 14 24 38 79 214 369 
Non-U.S. Independent 1 5 7 14 14 41 
Unknown/other 21 26 49 106 233 435 
1/ Table entries may not sum to totals because some patents are classified in 
multiple areas, others in none. 
                                                          
Mar. 18, 2006). 
 44. For table data, see Econ. Research Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Data: 
Agricultural Biotechnology Intellectual Property, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/AgBiotechIP/Gallery/Graphic2.htm (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2006). 
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Despite the success in promoting investment in research 
and development on new plant varieties and the application of 
biotechnology in agriculture, the strict protection of property 
rights has produced some concerns about the recent tendency 
toward mergers in the industry, which has led to a 
concentration of patents in fewer companies. Graph 3 shows 
the ratio of the percentage of patents held by the top ten 
assignees over the total number of patents.  As the graph 
shows, the concentration of agricultural biotech patents in the 
top ten assignees has dropped since the 1970s.  But if we 
include the patent ownership of subsidiary organizations, this 
ratio has increased over the years, indicating the effects of 
mergers on the ownership of the new technologies (Graph 3). As 
a result, mergers have increased the number of patents held by 
the top patent holders in the last decade. 
 
GRAPH 3.  CONCENTRATION OF AGRICULTURE BIOTECH 
PATENTS IN THE UNITED STATES45 
Concentration of Agriculture Biotech Patents by Assignees
 (Percentage of Top 10 Assignees over Total Number of Patents)
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SEED PROTECTION IN ARGENTINA: EVOLUTION AND 
DEVOLUTION OF THE LEGAL PROTECTION 
      The legal framework in Argentina is far from the 
comprehensive protection provided for seed producers in the 
                                                          
 45. For graph data, see Econ. Research Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Data: 
Agricultural Biotechnology Intellectual Property, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/AgBiotechIP/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2006). 
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United States.  Argentinean legislation has evolved over time, 
providing some timid increases in the protection of seed 
producers.  In 1935, Congress enacted the first law regulating 
plant varieties.46  Although this legislation provided for the 
registration of new seeds and required government approval for 
new varieties to be introduced in the market, it did not provide 
any legal protection to intellectual property rights for the new 
seeds.47  In the following decades, succeeding governments 
created diverse agencies in charge of managing the regulatory 
system.48  In 1973,  the Military Government passed Law No. 
20247—the “Law of Seeds.”49  This was the first piece of 
legislation giving commercialization rights to the inventors of 
new seed varieties.50  Although this law was a step forward in 
protecting intellectual property rights, it was not immediately 
enacted and had to wait until 1978 for its regimentation.51  Law 
No. 20247 provided for the creation of the National Seed 
Commission (Comision Nacional de Semillas, CONASE), in 
charge of advising and evaluating government policies 
regarding the regulatory regime.52  Second, it created a 
                                                          
 46. Law No. 12253, called “Ley de Granos,” was passed by Congress in 
October 1935. See Instituto Nacional de la Semilla (INASE), Evolucion del 
fitomejoramiento y la produccion de semillas en nuestro pais.  Estructuras 
oficiales y su marco regulatorio desde comienzos de siglo (1998) [hereinafter 
Evolucion], available at http://www.dpi.bioetica.org/ovnotas1.htm. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See Law No. 20247, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Mar. 30, 1973,  
available at www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/new/0-0/inase/pdf/Normativa/LEY-
20.247.PDF.  
 50. Article 22 of the law states: “The property right of a variety will be 
given for a period no less than 10 and no more than 20 years, according to the 
type of plant and the regulations.”  Id. 
 51. See Decree No. 1995 of 1978, available at www.mecon.gov.ar.  
 52. The law provides:  
The Commission will be formed by ten members designed by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. . . . Five of the members will be 
State representatives, two from the National Agency of Agriculture 
Control and Commercialization (Direccion Nacional de Fiscalizacion y 
Comercializacion), two from the National Institute of Agriculture 
Technology (Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia Agropecuaria) and one 
from the National Grain Board (Junta Nacional de Granos). Five 
other members will represent the private sector, one from the seeders, 
two from the seed traders and production and two from the seed 
users. The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock will name the 
president and vice-president from the members of the Commission. 
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national registry and a property registry for new varieties, 
providing exclusive commercialization rights to the owners for 
a term between ten and twenty years, depending on the type of 
seed.53  This system of varieties registration implied a two-step 
procedure: the inventor of a new variety should register the 
variety in the National Variety Registry54 and then apply for a 
property certificate to be included in the National Registry of 
Property of Varieties.55  Third, the law provided for the 
recognition of foreign seeds, but it established that the country 
of origin should provide similar protection for Argentine 
researchers.  Furthermore, the term of the property rights was 
limited to the number of years left in the original certification 
of property granted in the country of origin of the variety.56  
Fourth, the Executive Power could declare a new variety to be 
of “restricted public use,” implying that the owner of the variety 
should be compensated by the state and that the ownership 
should be transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture.57  Finally, 
the law recognized farmers’ rights to the use of seeds saved 
from a previous crop and researchers’ rights to use one variety 
of a seed to develop a new variety.58  As a result, the first legal 
                                                          
See Law No. 20247, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Mar. 30, 1973, at art. 5,  
available at www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/new/0-0/inase/pdf/Normativa/LEY-
20.247.PDF. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Chapter IV of Law No. 20247 provides the regulations for the 
registration of new varieties in the Registry.  See id. 
 55. Chapter V of Law No. 20247 provides the regulations for requesting 
the property of a new variety and its registration in the National Registry.  
See id. 
 56. Article 26 states: 
The property title requested for a foreign variety should be done by its 
inventor or legally authorized representative established in 
Argentina, and it will be granted only if the country of origin of the 
variety has similar property right protection for Argentine invented 
varieties.  In such cases, the term of the property will be up to the 
term that is left in the country of origin for the same variety. 
Id. at art. 26. 
 57. See id. at art. 28.  Article 29 limited the use of such right to two years, 
although the Executive Power could extend it for another two years.  See id. at 
art. 29. 
 58. Article 25 states: “The property of a variety does not prevent that 
other persons could use the variety for the creation of a new variety, which 
could be claimed by its creator without the consent of the owner of the original 
variety used in the process of creation.”  Id. at art. 25.  Article 27 provides 
that: “The property right of a variety is not affected if the seed is given by 
authorization of the owner, or somebody saves and sow seeds for his/her own 
KESAN_FINAL_UPDATED 6/7/2006  6:30:17 PM 
584 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 7:2 
 
 
registration of new varieties in the country began in 1978, after 
the law was enacted by the Executive Power Decree No. 1995 of 
1978.59  This Decree was proposed by the CONASE60 and 
slightly modified by Decree No. 50/89.61  Nonetheless, this 
legislation did not provide enough protection and enforcement 
of intellectual property rights for new seed varieties, since its 
regulations are similar to the PVPA certificates in the United 
States. 
     A modification to the 1978 Decree was enacted in 1991, 
introducing important changes to the regulatory regime and 
updating the legislation according to international standards.  
The Executive Power issued Decree No. 2183/91 on October 21, 
1991.62  The modification to Law No. 20247 originated not only 
from the need for modernization of property rights legislation, 
but also from the political pressure exerted by some 
associations of seeders and other interest groups inside 
CONASE, such as the Argentine Seed Association (ASA) and 
the Association for the Protection of Plant Breeders (ARPOV).63  
                                                          
use, or use or sell as primary product or feeding the seed obtained from the 
crop of the variety.”  Id. at art. 27. 
 59. See Decree No. 1995 of 1978, available at www.mecon.gov.ar. 
 60. See CASEM, Camara Argentina de Semilleros Multiplicadores, 1er 
Congreso Nacional de Multiplicadores de Semillas, Circular Interna No. 066 
(Oct. 15, 1999), 
http://www.cedasaba.com.ar/CircularesInternas/CircInt066.htm.   
 61. See Decree No. 50/89, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, June 11 1989. 
 62. See Decree No. 2183/91, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, November 1, 1991, 
available at http://www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/new/0-
0/inase/pdf/Normativa/DECR-2183-91.PDF. 
 63. At a symposium on Intellectual Property Rights in Plant 
Biotechnology, Oscar Domingo presented the relevant legal framework in 
Argentina: 
  ASA, which has been in operation for 54 years and groups 
together the 67 main seed companies, and ARPOV, set up more 
recently, are the bodies which deal with sectoral union activity and 
work for the technological development and protection of phytogenetic 
creations.  ASA, which is member [sic] of CONABIA, since it was set 
up 11 years ago, has played a major role in the discussion of the 
regulations which Argentina now possesses for the commercial 
release of a transgenic event. 
  Three years ago, the Association of Agricultural Technology 
Chambers (ACTA) was set up and groups together the sectors 
providing technological material for agricultural production, seeds 
(ASA), agrochemicals and fertilizers (Chamber of Plant Health and 
Fertilizers – CASAFE), veterinary products (Chamber of Veterinary 
Producers – CAPROVE) and agricultural machinery (Association of 
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       There were several significant modifications.  First, 
CONASE continued to be an advisory committee to the 
Secretary of Agriculture64 and other specific agencies created 
by this Decree.65  Second, a new agency, the National Seed 
Service (Servicio Nacional de Semillas, SENASE) was created 
to manage and enforce the regulatory regime for new 
varieties.66  As a result, all the activities concerned with the 
management of the system were concentrated in a specific 
government agency instead of being dispersed among different 
secretaries inside the Secretary of Agriculture. Accordingly, 
this change would allow the government to focus on 
enforcement and the definition of norms for the market of new 
varieties.  Third, the Decree defined the specific steps and 
requirements for registration of a new variety and the granting 
of property rights.67  Fourth, the Decree defined the different 
types of plants that could be registered, including seeds or germ 
and phytogenetic breeding varieties.68  Fifth, the special 
“restricted public use” right of the Executive Power was 
preserved.69  Finally, the use of saved seed was restricted only 
for research purposes and farmer’s privilege.70  In addition, 
Decree No. 2817 of December 30, 1991, created the National 
Seed Institute (Instituto Nacional de Semillas, INASE), which 
                                                          
Tractor Manufacturers – AFAT), which has been acquiring major 
importance in agro-industrial production activities, and is the most 
important in Argentina. 
  As a result of the work of those institutions, Argentina acceded to 
the 1978 Act of the UPOV Convention and discussions regarding 
accession to the 1991 Act of the UPOV Convention are very advanced. 
DOMINGO, supra note 14, at 11. 
 64. In this text, “Secretary of Agriculture” and “Ministry of Agriculture” 
are the same, since the Ministry of Agriculture was renamed to Secretary of 
Agriculture in the early 1990s. Its role in the government continues to be the 
same. 
 65. Chapter II of the Decree established the role of the CONASE.  See 
Decree No. 2183/91, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Nov. 1, 1991, available at 
http://www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/new/0-0/inase/pdf/Normativa/DECR-2183-
91.PDF. 
 66. Chapter III of Decree No. 2183/91 established the main activities for 
the Servicio Nacional de Semillas.  See id. 
 67. Chapters V to VII of Decree No. 2183/91 describe the procedures for 
registration of new varieties.  See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Article 41 of Decree No. 2183/91 establishes the different cases in 
which authorization from the owner of the variety is needed.  See id. 
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replaced the SENASE in the management of Law No. 20247.71  
This agency is in charge of the national registry for varieties 
and property of seeds, the enactment of rules regarding the 
management of the system, and the enforcement of the 
regulations of the law.72  By creating this new agency, the 
government sought to improve enforcement and control of 
property rights in new varieties: 
One of the main achievements of the process, initiated in 1990 and 
completed and consolidated with the creation of INASE, was to make 
more transparent the commerce of self-pollinating seed species, 
particularly soybean and wheat, where the legal market for these 
species reached just 25% of the total demand of seeds.  This meant 
that most of the market for seeds had no guarantee of identity and 
quality, there was a high degree of tax evasion and there was no 
recognition of the property rights of the inventors of varieties 
registered in property giving as a result a disincentive to invest in 
new varieties.73 
However, this kind of property rights protection has not 
been useful in protecting the soybean seed market from 
“brown-bagging” and stealing.74 
In contrast to the CONASE, the INASE’s only role is the 
management and enforcement of the different issues 
concerning commercial rights on seeds, although the same 
constituencies that formed the CONASE were represented in 
this agency.75 
                                                          
 71. See Decree No. 2817/91 Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Apr. 6, 1992,  
available at http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/5000-
9999/8052/texact.htm.   
 72. See id. 
 73. Evolucion, supra note 46, at 15. 
 74. Discussing the depression of soybean seed prices by the black market 
sale of seeds in Argentina, the U.S. General Accounting Office found:  
A group of Argentine seed companies and breeders, called the 
Argentine Association for the Protection of Plant Varieties, in 
cooperation with the government, have had an effort under way since 
1990 to enforce the law and limit the sale of uncertified seed on the 
black market. The effort helped reduce black market sales from about 
three-quarters of all soybean seed sales in 1992 to about half in 1994. 
However, according to Argentine industry officials, black market sales 
subsequently increased in response to higher prices for commercial 
seeds following the initial marketing of Roundup Ready soybean 
seeds in 1996. 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 13, at 15-16. 
 75. See Decree No. 2817/91 Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Apr. 6, 1992,  
available at http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/5000-
9999/8052/texact.htm.  
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       With respect to the farmer’s privilege, the INASE issued 
Norm 35/96 INASE in February 1996 to define the limits and 
scope of this privilege, broadly established in Law No. 20247.76  
Under Norm 35/96 INASE tried to limit the application of the 
farmer’s privilege to specific cases in which the farmer actually 
saves some seed for the next crop, limiting the scope of saved 
seed established by Article 27 of Law No. 20247, which allowed 
other uses for saved seed.77  It established specific rules for 
saved seeds to be considered under this privilege.  For example, 
the main criteria for being considered under this rule are that 
first, the solicitor should be a farmer.  Then, the farmer should 
prove that the original seed was legally bought, and the saved 
seed was obtained from the original, legally bought seed.  Next, 
the saved seed should be specifically set aside and 
distinguished from other varieties.  Finally, the farmer must 
show the purpose of use, noting the prohibition on any transfer 
or sale of the saved seeds.78  The Norm increased the difficulty 
for farmers to save seed for other purposes, as it tried to control 
the trade of non-legal varieties. 
In 1994, Law No. 24376, enacted on September 21, 
modified Law No. 20247 and its decrees,79 bringing the 
legislation up to the guidelines set by the International 
Agreement for the Protection of the Vegetal Obtentions (UPOV 
78), approved in Paris, France in 1961 and modified in Geneva, 
Switzerland in 1972 and 1978.80  Law No. 24376 approved the 
UPOV 78 agreement and established that the clauses of this 
agreement should prevail over the regulations of Law No. 
                                                          
 76. See Secretaria de Agricultura Ganaderia y Pesca [SAGyP], Resolucion 
INASE No. 35/96 (Feb. 28, 1996), available at 
http://www.inase.gov.ar/tikiwiki/tiki-
list_file_gallery.php?galleryId=2&offset=0&sort_mode=description_desc. 
 77. See id. at art. 1; see Law No. 20247, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Mar. 
30, 1973, at art. 27, available at www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/new/0-
0/inase/pdf/Normativa/LEY-20.247.PDF.   
 78. See Secretaria de Agricultura Ganaderia y Pesca [SAGyP], Resolucion 
INASE No. 35/96, at art. 1 (Feb. 28, 1996), available at 
http://www.inase.gov.ar/tikiwiki/tiki-
list_file_gallery.php?galleryId=2&offset=0&sort_mode=description_desc. 
 79. See Law No. 24376, Honorable Congreso de la Nacion Argentina, Oct. 
25, 1994, available at http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/0-
4999/768/norma.htm.   
 80. See International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 
The UPOV System of Plant Variety Protection, 
http://www.upov.int/en/about/upov_system.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006) 
(describing the UPOV system of plant protection). 
KESAN_FINAL.DOC 05/11/2006  02:16:40 PM 
588 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 7:2 
 
 
20247 and its regulatory decrees.81  The changes with respect 
to the previous legislation are not too relevant, except for the 
political decision to be a part of the UPOV international 
agreement.82  That said, the adoption of the UPOV 78 
guidelines is a limited gesture since the UPOV 78 guidelines 
are not as thorough as the more recent UPOV 91 agreement, 
which has not yet been adopted in Argentina.83 
     Due to the economic crisis in 2000, the Executive Power 
ordered the Secretary of Agriculture to close the INASE, 
leaving the regulatory regime for new varieties without any 
management.84  The Institute was reopened in 200485 by Law 
No. 25845.86  The Board of the INASE represents the different 
economic stakeholders in the regulatory framework of 
agricultural seeds (Figure 1).87 
                                                          
 81. See Law No. 24376, Honorable Congreso de la Nacion Argentina, Oct. 
25, 1994, available at http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/0-
4999/768/norma.htm. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See http://www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/ (documenting the evolution of 
legislation and the adoption of the UPOV 78 treaty); see also Proteccion Legal 
De Obtenciones Vegetales, 
http://www.proyectonacion.entupc.com/proyectosart/proteccion_legas_obtecion
_vegetales.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006) (describing a bill presented this 
year in Congress by Congressmen Eduardo Di Cola proposing the adoption of 
UPOV 91). 
 84. See FRANCISCO PIROVANO, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., GAIN REPORT 
AR4022: ARGENTINA PLANTING SEEDS ANNUAL 2004, at 4 (2004) (noting that 
although the INASE was dissolved in 2000 due to a lack of budget, it was 
reactivated on January 6, 2004 “to assure quality and proper identification of 
the seed to be marketed, to promote the supply of improved varieties through 
the protection of their property rights, to foster production and marketing of 
planting seeds as a way to improve crop production in Argentina”). 
 85. See id. 
 86. The law states: 
Article 1: the Decree 1104/200, which dissolved the Instituto Nacional 
de Semillas (INASE), is derogated. 
Article 2: By the present law we ratify the validity of the Decree 
2817/91, restoring the Instituto Nacional de Semillas (INASE) the 
functions, missions and structures regulated by the Law 20247, the 
Decree 2183/91 and the Administrative Decision 489/96. 
Law No. 25845, Honorable Congreso de la Nacion Argentina, Jan. 7, 2004, 
available at http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/90000-
94999/91549/norma.htm. 
 87. See id.  The Consejo Federal Agropecuario was created by Law No. 
23843 of 1990 and is a Council comprised of representatives of the rural sector 
from the different regions of the country.  The director of the Secretary of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Fishing of the Nation presides over this council.  
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FIGURE 1.  STRUCTURE OF INASE88 
Figure 1: Structure of INASE 
Board of Directors
(10 Members) 
President: Named 
by the Executive 
Power 
1 Director: designated by the Federal 
Agriculture and Livestock Council (CFA) 
(Consejo Federal Agropecuario) 
1 Director: designated by the National 
Agriculture and Livestock Technology 
(INTA) (Instituto National de Tecnologia 
Agropecuaria) 
1 Director: designated by seed producers 
1 Director: designated by seed registrars 
1 Director: designated by seed traders 
1 Director: designated by fruit and trees 
producers 
2 Directors: designated by farmers and 
consumers 
 
The evolution of the legislation in Argentina has focused on the 
development and improvement of a Plant Variety Protection 
type of property rights without any advance in the field of 
patenting new varieties. 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED SEED AND THE QUEST FOR 
PATENT PROTECTION 
     The Argentine government was one of the first, together 
with the United States, to allow the use of genetically modified 
crops.  In 1991, the Secretary of Agriculture created the 
Advisory National Commission for Rural Biotechnology 
(CONABIA, Comision Nacional Asesora de Biotecnologia 
Agropecuaria).89  This advisory group, composed of 
representatives from the government and the private sector, 
helped the government to develop a regulatory framework for 
                                                          
See Law No. 23843, Honorable Congreso de la Nacion Argentina, October 19, 
1990, available at 
http://www.carbap.org/root/MostrarDocumento.asp?id=614&accion=4. 
 88. For figure data, see Law No. 25845, Honorable Congreso de la Nacion 
Argentina, Jan. 7, 2004, available at 
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/90000-
94999/91549/norma.htm. 
 89. See Secretaria de Agricultura Ganaderia y Pesca [SAGyP], Resolucion 
No. 124/91 (Oct. 24, 1991), available at 
http://www.senasa.gov.ar/marcolegal/Res_RY/ry_124_91.htm. 
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the application and commercialization of biotechnology in 
agriculture.90  As a consequence, in 1992 the CONABIA 
recommended that the Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fishing enact a set of rules and requirements for the approval 
of experimentation with genetically modified seeds.  The 
Secretary responded with Resolution 656/92 for Genetically 
Modified Microorganisms.91  Accordingly, the CONABIA is in 
charge of reviewing all the applications for the use of 
genetically modified organisms and recommending the 
approval or denial of each application to the Secretary of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Fishing.92  This resolution was 
                                                          
 90. Resolution 328/97 establishes that: 
The Commission is composed of two representatives from INTA 
(National Institute of Agriculture and Livestock Technology), two 
from the National University of Buenos Aires (UBA), two from the 
Argentine Forum of Biotechnology, two from the Asociacion de 
Semilleros Argentinos (Argentine Seed Producers Association), two 
from the private livestock sector, two from the Consejo Nacional de 
Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET), two from INASE, 
four from the National Service of Agricultural and food Safety and 
Quality (SENASA) and some directors of specific government 
agencies, two professionals on issues of livestock safety and quality, 
two professionals on issues of plant safety and quality, and other 
directors from specific government agencies. 
Secretaria de Agricultura Ganaderia y Pesca [SAGyP], Resolucion No. 328/97 
(May 28, 1997), available at 
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/40000-
44999/43548/norma.htm. The composition of the CONABIA was modified in 
part by Resolution 244/04: 
The Commission is composed of two representatives from INTA 
(National Agriculture and Livestock Technology Institute), two from 
the National University of Buenos Aires (UBA), two from the 
Argentine Forum of Biotechnology, two from the Asociacion de 
Semilleros Argentinos (Argentine Seed Producers Association), two 
from the private livestock sector, two from the Consejo Nacional de 
Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET) and some directors 
of specific government agencies. 
Secretaria de Agricultura Ganaderia y Pesca [SAGyP], Resolucion No. 244/04 
(Feb. 18, 2004), available at 
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/90000-
94999/93050/norma.htm. 
 91. See OFICINA DE BIOTECNOLOGÍA, SECRETARÍA DE AGRICULTURA, 
GANADERÍA, PESCA Y ALIMENTOS, MARCO REGULATORIO DE LA 
BIOTECNOLOGÍA AGROPECUARIA EN LA REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA 234 (2005). 
 92. See Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Pesca y Alimentos, 
Bioseguridad Agropecuaria: La Experience de la CONABIA [hereinafter 
CONABIA Experience], http://www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/new/0-
0/programas/conabia/bioseguridad_agropecuaria2.php (last visited Feb. 27, 
2006). 
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improved with further regulations for the trials in each crop by 
Resolution 226/97, also recommended by the CONABIA.93  The 
regulation of these permits was enacted by Resolution 289/97, 
complemented by Resolution 131/98, and replaced by 
Resolution 39/03.94  From 1991 to 2004, the Secretary gave 788 
permits for experimentation with genetically modified 
organisms.95 
The procedure for obtaining a permit consists of two 
stages.  First, the CONABIA evaluates the application and 
grants or denies a permit for experimentation.  The second 
stage, which allows for extensive use of experimentation, 
consists of determining whether the use of the genetically 
modified organism will have an impact on the environment 
similar to the one produced by a similar non-genetically 
modified organism.96  Only eleven applications passed the 
second stage (Table 5). 
 
TABLE 5.  PERMITS GRANTED BY CONABIA97 
Table 5: Permits Granted 
Seed Characteristic Resolution – Date Company 
Soybean Tolerance to Glifosato SAPyA 115, 3-7-96 Nidera S.A. 
Corn Resistance to Leptidopteros SAPyA 458, 8-2-96 Ciba-Geigy 
Corn Tolerance Glufosinato de 
Ammonia 
SAGPyA 77 2-11-98 AgrEvo S.A. 
Corn Resistance Lepidopteros SAGPyA 289 3-29-98 Monsanto 
Cotton Resistance Lepidopteros SAGPyA 290 5-29-98 Monsanto 
Corn Tolerance to Glifosato SAGPyA 79 10-8-98 Monsanto 
Cotton Tolerance to Glifosato SAGPyA 721 11-11-99 Monsanto 
Corn Resistance Lepidopteros SAGPyA 442 8-16-00 Novartis 
Soybean Tolerance Glufosinato de 
Ammonia 
SAGPyA 47 5-7-01 Hoechst Schering 
AgrEvo S.A. 
Corn Tolerance to Glifosato SAGPyA 361 5-2-03 Monsanto 
Corn Resistance Lepidopteros and 
Tolerance Glufosinato de 
Ammonia 
SAGPyA 209 9-1-03 Dow AgroSciences 
S.A. and Pioneer 
Argentina S.A. 
 
                                                          
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. 
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     After obtaining this permit, companies need to obtain 
another authorization to commercialize the genetically 
modified variety.  Ten of the varieties listed in Table 4 obtained 
this authorization.98  To obtain this last authorization from the 
Secretary and CONABIA takes at least three years.99 
     Given the increased interest in genetically modified 
organisms and the high number of registrations of new 
varieties that are genetically modified (Table 6), the 
government decided to create a special agency in charge of 
advising on biotechnology policy.  By Resolution 219/2001, the 
Secretary created the National Advisory Commission for 
Agricultural Biotechnology,100 and by Resolution 362/2003 
made the Biotechnology Area independent from the Sub-
Secretary of Agricultural and Food Policy.101  Finally, by 
Resolution 244/2004, the Secretary eliminated these two 
agencies and created the Office of Biotechnology (Oficina de 
Biotecnologia), which is in charge of advising and managing all 
issues related to the biotechnology policy of the country.102  
Pursuant to this change, the CONABIA depends directly on the 
Office of Biotechnology.  As we can see, the regulatory 
framework for biotechnological discoveries in agriculture is in 
constant flux, with different agencies in charge and changes to 
the structure of the management system.  This differs from the 
more stable and well-defined system in place in the United 
States. 
                                                          
 98. See CONABIA Experience, supra note 92. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See Secretaria de Agricultura Ganaderia y Pesca [SAGyP], Resolucion 
No. 219/2001 (Sept. 10, 2001), available at 
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/65000-
69999/68853/norma.htm. 
 101. See Secretaria de Agricultura Ganaderia y Pesca [SAGyP], Resolucion 
No. 362/2003 (May 2, 2003), available at 
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/80000-
84999/84847/norma.htm. 
 102. See Secretaria de Agricultura Ganaderia y Pesca [SAGyP], Resolucion 
No. 244/2004 (Feb. 18, 2004), available at 
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/90000-
94999/93050/norma.htm. 
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TABLE 6.  NEW TRANSGENIC VARIETIES REGISTERED IN 
ARGENTINA103 
Table 6: Registration of New Transgenic Varieties 1995-2003 
Soybean Corn 
Year Transgenic Non  
transgenic
Total Transgenic 
as % of 
Total 
Total Conventional IMI 
(Non-
GMO)
Transgenic Transgenic 
as % of 
Total 
1995 - 8 8 0.0 34 33 1 0 0.0 
1996 5 11 16 31.3 33 32 1 0 0.0 
1997 12 23 35 34.3 47 46 1 0 0.0 
1998 18 18 36 50.0 42 32 2 8 19.0 
1999 28 13 41 68.3 58 39 10 9 15.5 
2000 19 7 26 73.1 49 31 3 15 30.6 
2001 32 3 35 91.4 82 51 1 30 36.6 
2002 13 2 15 86.7 55 36 2 17 30.9 
2003 9 - 9 100.0 39 24 1 14 35.9 
 
In contrast to the situation in the United States, 
companies in Argentina cannot look for patent protection for 
new varieties or genetically modified organisms.  Despite the 
many changes to the law and the demand for new technologies 
in genetics, the new legal framework does not allow for strict 
property rights protection via a patent system; new genetically 
modified varieties must resort to the same weak protection as 
other varieties. 
     From 1864 to 1995, the patent system in Argentina was 
regulated by Law 111.104  This law did not specify any 
particular regulation with respect to plants, but during this 
period there were no patent applications for a new variety.  
Furthermore, all the matters with regard to plant varieties 
were derived from the regulations of Law No. 20247105 and, 
later, Law No. 24376.106  In 1995, Congress enacted new patent 
laws modifying Law No. 111 (Law Nos. 24481 and 24572).107  
                                                          
 103. See DOMINGO, supra note 14, at 9. 
 104. See MIGUEL ANGEL RAPELA, DERECHOS DE PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL 
EN VEGETALES SUPERIORES (2000). 
 105. See Law No. 20247, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Mar. 30, 1973,  
available at www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/new/0-0/inase/pdf/Normativa/LEY-
20.247.PDF. 
 106. See Law No. 24376, Honorable Congreso de la Nacion Argentina, Oct. 
25, 1994, available at http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/0-
4999/768/norma.htm. 
 107. See RAPELA, supra note 104.  
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According to the new regulatory framework, the patenting of 
new plants is expressly prohibited, although it does not specify 
new plant varieties.108  Furthermore, patenting of new varieties 
is not legally possible, as the law of 1994 adhered to UPOV 78, 
which prohibited a regulatory system of double protection.   
There is already, moreover, a government agency that grants 
Plant Variety Protection certificates,109 and new laws passed in 
2000, Laws  Nos. 24481 and 24575, allow the patenting of 
biotechnology products and organisms, including  
pharmaceutical products.110  Apparently, these laws could 
provide a legal vehicle for patenting plant varieties, but the 
prohibitions of the Patent Law of 1995, the UPOV 78, and the 
Decree 260/96, which all prohibit the patenting of plant 
varieties, generate uncertainty over the ability to obtain a 
patent.111  Congress has been dealing with some pressure from 
seed producers to approve a new law with the UPOV 91 
guidelines, which support the existence of multiple systems for 
property rights protection (Figure 2).  Nonetheless, even if this 
legislation is passed, the courts will have to interpret the 
patent law and decide if the prohibition of patenting plants can 
be extended to plant varieties.  As a consequence, the legal 
framework is far from creating sweeping changes in the way 
property rights are regulated and enforced. 
                                                          
 108. “Since the Patent law in Argentina prohibits the patenting of plants, 
in fact prohibits the patenting of varieties since, even though not all plants 
can be labeled as plant varieties, all plant varieties are composed by plants 
without exception.”  See id. at 151. (author translation from the original: “[L]a 
ley de patentes de Argentina al prohibir taxativamente el patentamiento de 
plantas esta, de hecho, prohibiendo el patentamiento de variedades ya que, si 
bien no todas las plantas pueden ser categorizadas como variedades vegetales, 
todas las variedades vegetales estan compuestas por plantas sin excepcion 
alguna.”). 
 109. See id. 
 110. See VICIEN, supra note 12, at 19. 
 111. See id. 
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FIGURE 2.  TIMELINE OF ARGENTINE LEGISLATION112 
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As Figure 2 shows, the legal framework for plant varieties, 
both genetically and non-genetically modified, is diffuse, 
complex, and rapidly changing, producing complaints and 
hesitation from seed producers.  This particular system has 
been widely criticized by international seed producers.  For 
example, Monsanto decided to stop selling soybean seeds in 
Argentina because its Roundup Ready soybean variety was 
being widely used by farmers who did not pay royalties or user 
rights of any kind.113  As a consequence, they decided to stop 
the commercialization of any soybean varieties in the country, 
given the lack of protection. The government has tried to find a 
solution without having to change the legal framework—a 
daunting task given the economic interests at stake—by 
proposing the creation of a tax.114 
                                                          
 112. For figure data, see generally http://www.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2006). 
 113. See Tony Smith, Argentine Soy Exports Are up, but Monsanto Is Not 
Amused, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at W1. 
 114. See Argentina to Propose New Royalty Payment Rules for GM Seed, 
SEEDQUEST, Jan. 27, 2005, 
http://www.seedquest.com/News/releases/2005/january/11144.htm. 
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USING TAXES TO OVERCOME PROPERTY RIGHTS 
FAILURE 
        In early 2004, Monsanto decided to stop the 
commercialization of soybeans in Argentina due to the lack of 
property rights protection.  This decision caused authorities 
concern, since genetically-modified seeds, such as Monsanto’s 
Roundup Ready soybean, represent around 95% of the soybean 
planted in the country.115  As a result of Monsanto’s protests, 
the government is proposing a tax on farmers’ crops.  This tax 
would be distributed among seed producers as a mechanism to 
compensate them for the lack of property rights enforcement.116  
If we consider the effect of a tax on the price of the seed in our 
model, we can show that, theoretically, the implementation of a 
tax can be a substitute for the effective protection of property 
rights.  In the case that the government can find the optimal 
tax, investment will reach the optimal level of secure property 
rights.  Even though the imposition of a tax would ideally 
increase the level of property rights protection close to the 
optimal level, there are some drawbacks to this approach. 
      First, nothing ensures that seed producers are going to 
receive the full revenue from this tax.  There is always a chance 
that part of the revenues will be used by the government.  This 
is very different from secure property rights, where inventors 
are certain to receive the full revenue of their royalties.  
Second, even though the government distributes all the 
revenue to producers, there could be transfers to other 
producers, and it is not clear how the government is going to 
determine the exact market share of each producer.  Third, a 
general tax does not discriminate among different users and 
uses of the invention.  Since it seems that there is no particular 
exemption to this tax, we are in the presence of a compulsory 
license, which can have important effects on the allocation of 
research and development resources.  Finally, it is assumed 
that the cost of implementing and enforcing a tax are equal to 
or less than the costs of enforcing property rights.  If that is not 
the case, then society may be paying a higher transaction cost 
in order to protect property rights. 
                                                          
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The impact of the definition, scope of protection, and 
enforcement of property rights on biotechnology in agricultural 
markets is a topic of much debate.  Scholars and policymakers 
debate the pros and cons of different property regimes that 
protect plant innovation.  According to the literature, the 
effective protection of property rights offers adequate incentives 
for research and development in a biotechnology market 
controlled by private firms.  This kind of protection was not 
needed decades ago when most of the research was done by 
governmental or nonprofit institutions.  However, in the last 
few decades the growth of private research and the 
consolidation of the private sector in multinational corporations 
have brought the issue of property rights to the international 
arena.  This Article addressed the issue of property rights 
protection in the United States and Argentina.  Both countries 
represent an important share of the world seed market and are 
important actors in international agricultural markets. 
The legal framework for property rights protection is very 
different in Argentina than in the United States.  Seed 
producer rights are more loosely defined, and the enforcement 
of those rights is limited.  Patenting is not available for new 
varieties, and UPOV 91 has not yet been approved.  This 
situation has generated complaints from seed producers, 
especially foreign producers, who were unable to enforce their 
rights on the seeds they introduce into the market.  
Nonetheless, farmers and even the government have been 
eager to adopt new technologies for seeds.  This situation has 
created an interesting problem since the demand for new 
technologies is high, but the incentives for those technologies to 
be marketed and distributed are distorted. 
Some initiatives, like compulsory licensing through a tax 
on the sales of grains, have generated an intense debate and 
can prove to be more burdensome and costly than the creation 
of a more effective regulatory system.  Furthermore, the 
evolution of property rights legislation has advanced at a very 
slow pace, with many drawbacks and political stalemates.  In 
addition, enforcement has been slow and inadequate. 
The comparative analysis of this Article provides a useful 
framework to understand the complexities of international 
regulatory systems and the challenges that multinational and 
local seed producers face in developing countries with weak 
regulatory systems for the protection of property rights. The 
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implications of not creating and providing significant legal 
regimes protecting agricultural biotechnology innovation has 
significant impact in terms of the allocation of resources 
devoted to both indigenous research on plant innovation and 
also on the choices being made by growers acting in response to 
current weak property regimes. These issues merit additional 
inquiry and careful consideration as we debate the various 
policy options with respect to intellectual property protection in 
developing countries. Furthermore, this Article shows the 
complexity and changing characteristics of property rights 
regimes in developing countries.  In order to promote a more 
efficient international market, the issues raised by this Article 
must be addressed.  Otherwise, companies will face important 
challenges investing in international markets, and technologies 
will not be disseminated as a consequence of incongruent and 
inadequate intellectual property regulations. 
 
